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Abstract
The rapid decrease in the size of mobile devices, coupled with an increase in capability, has enabled a swift
proliferation of small and very capable devices into our daily lives. With such a prevalence of pervasive
computing, the interaction among portable devices needs to be continuous and invisible to device users. As
these devices become better connected, collaboration among them will play a vital role in sharing resources in
an ad-hoc manner. The sharing of resources works as a facilitator for pervasive devices. However, this ad hoc
interaction among devices provides the potential for security breaches. Trust can fight against such security
violations by restricting malicious nodes from participating in interactions. Therefore, we need a unified trust
relationship model between entities, which captures both the needs of the traditional computing world and the
world of pervasive computing where the continuum of trust is based on identity, physical context or a
combination of both. Here, we present a context specific and reputation-based trust model along with a brief
survey of trust models suitable for peer-to-peer and ad-hoc environments. This paper presents a multi-hop
recommendation protocol and a flexible behavioral model to handle interactions. One other contribution of this
paper is the integration of an initial trust model; this model categorizes services or contexts in different security
levels based on their security needs, and these security needs are considered in trust bootstrapping. The other
major contribution of this paper is a simple method of handling malicious recommendations. This paper also
illustrates the implementation and evaluation of our proposed formal trust model.
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1. Introduction
As people interact more in a world of pervasive computing, there is an increased interaction between people
and smart devices. In such a world, computing power will move from big desktops to very small and miniature
devices. Because of this increased efficiency of technology, seamless integration of computing power and
human lives will become very important. And only advances in the pervasive computing era can help achieve
this goal. Significant numbers of handheld devices may frequently join and leave this pervasive environment.
These devices need to communicate and share content in an ad-hoc manner. The increasing availability of small
computing devices (PDAs, mobile phones, etc.) and the deployment of next-generation wireless networks
(UMTS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) are helping to make the vision of Weiser (1993) a reality. As mutual collaboration is
unavoidable in a pervasive environment, it is very important to limit the interaction among trustworthy devices.
For that, we need to find the answer to the question “With which node(s) should I interact and with which I
should not?” Trust models have been developed to resolve this issue. These models are also responsible for
establishing and managing trust relationships among the interacting devices. We believe that there is a need for
a continuum of trust which mimics models the real world as closely as possible. In other words, we need to
capture the real world model of trust where entities (people and devices) trust one another to varying degrees
and extents.
Trust is an integral part of security and one of the prime concerns in pervasive computing because of its
decision-making role in resource sharing. Trust models have been proposed by researchers considering the
diverse scenarios of distributed systems, P2P networks, agent based systems, pervasive computing, etc. Several
well-known trust models fail to be suitable in pervasive computing due to the use of different cryptographic and
secret key sharing techniques like (Zhou and Haas, 1999) threshold cryptography (Josang, 1996, Josang,
1999, Josang and Knapskog, 1998), certificate, key binding, and trust relationship. These are considered too
heavy weight for pervasive devices. Due to the presence of a fixed infrastructure in which a fixed device has to
act as security agent in each domain, or a central server which is a requirement of central key server, trust

models proposed by Garfinkel (1995) are inappropriate here since devices can leave or join at any moment in
this environment. Trust models requiring pre-configuration like the Distributed Public Key Model (Zhou and
Haas, 1999) are also infeasible in a pure ad-hoc scenario where participating devices are not known to one
another ahead of time. Some trust models are not viable in this environment due to their overly complex
structure. This category includes Dynamic Trust Management (Blaze et al., 1996) (trust actions and policies have
been specified through complex language), Virtual Community Trust (Rahman and Hailes, 2000) (extremely long
recommendation chain), and Resurrecting Duckling model (Stajano and Anderson, 2002) (hierarchical chain of
security).
These models suffer from one or more major shortcoming. However, the majority of these models considered a
constant initial trust value for service-requesting devices, which is totally unknown to the service provider. Yet
an effective and nearly accurate initial trust calculation is necessary since it is a precondition for successful trust
evolution. Therefore, trust models must incorporate an adaptive initial trust while deciding whether to accept or
reject a service request. Some preliminary work on an initial trust model is presented in Ahamed et al.,
2008a, Ahamed et al., 2008b). Furthermore, most of the trust models have avoided the issue of malicious
recommendations by passing this responsibility on to an authentication mechanism. But real life scenarios and
facts prove that malicious nodes may exist even after adopting authentication techniques. So a trust model
should also have the feature of handling malicious recommendations. Moreover, most of the trust models are
node/device specific; that means they either trust or distrust a device as a whole. But consider a real life
scenario where a device may be trusted for a context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and not trusted for some other context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . Thus, we
need a context specific trust model and initial work on such a trust model is presented in Haque and Ahamed
(2007). This paper describes the details of design, implementation and evaluation of the context specific trust
model that incorporates dynamic initial trust and an efficient technique to deal with a malicious
recommendation.
The contributions we present in our paper can be summarized as follows: (1) a survey of all trust models of the
pervasive computing environment. (2) Formal definitions and classification of desired properties of ‘trust’, along
with a recommendation protocol and an omnipresent behavioral model. (3) Architecture and conceptual
diagram of our omnipresent trust model. (4) An initial trust protocol for determining a dynamic initial trust for
an unknown device based on the security level of the requested context. (5) A simple statistical model for
isolating malicious recommendations and gradually weeding out malicious nodes. (6) Simulation, performance
measurement, and prototype implementation of our proposed trust model.
The organization of our paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the motivation behind our proposal. A survey of
all trust models in a pervasive environment are presented in Section 3. The definition and important
characteristics of trust are presented in Section 4. The classification of trust is described briefly in Section 5.
Section 6 demonstrates the architecture and state diagram of our proposed model. The formation of different
types of trust is discussed in Section 7. Sections 8 Recommended trust protocol, 9 Direct trust protocol, 10 Initial
trust protocol describe the recommended, direct, and initial trust protocol, respectively. Overall trust calculation
is explained in Section 11. Section 12 presents a malicious recommendation handling process. Our evaluation
methodologies and some results are described in Section 13. Along with the conclusion, some open issues are
stated in Section 14.

2. Motivation
Pervasive computing is susceptible and vulnerable to malicious active and passive snoopers. This is due to the
unavoidable inter-device dependency, as well as a common shared medium, very transitory connectivity, and
the absence of a fixed trust infrastructure. Pervasive devices depend on each other for resources since the small
devices do not have the luxury of containing all required resources due to several limitations including poor

battery power and small memory storage. Hence, the issue of resource sharing comes up. In the volatile
scenario of pervasive computing, where each device can join and leave arbitrarily, the knowledge of a fairly
trusted device is very important for other devices. If a malicious device is considered to be a trusted neighbor in
such a network, then the security and privacy of the whole system might collapse. Consider a hospital scenario
as an example, where doctors, nurses, and other medical staffs can communicate with one another through a
wireless network. A new person can enter the hospital premise as a visitor. He could possibly communicate with
others posing as a doctor and access sophisticated and classified patient records. Hence, a trust model is very
important for pervasive computing applications in order to determine trusted neighbors. This trust model will
also be responsible for detecting malicious users within the network. Since mutual collaboration is unavoidable
in this scenario, it is very important for one device to find out the trustworthiness of the service-requesting
device before sharing service. For that, we need to find the answer to the question “To which node should I
provide service and to which node should I not?” Trust models have been developed to resolve this issue, and
be responsible for establishing and managing trust relationships among the interacting devices. Thus, the trust
becomes an integral part of security and one of the prime concerns in pervasive computing because of its
decision-making role in resource sharing (Robinson et al., 2004).
It is a common scenario for a device (service provider) to receive a service-sharing request from a device (service
requester) unknown to it. In these cases, the service provider (SP) device makes a decision based on the
recommendation of other devices who know the service-requesting (SR) device. This general idea of reputationbased trust models works fine with the assumption that there are no malicious recommendations. But that is
not a real life scenario. Some trust models have bypassed this issue by assigning this responsibility to
the authentication mechanism. However, the fact is that, despite the presence of an authentication mechanism,
we can find active malicious devices in the network. We need a model to identify malicious recommendations to
ensure the accuracy of the trust model.
Moreover, a majority of trust models did not take into account security concerns of the context while
bootstrapping trust. In some models, security is considered with the evolution of trust. Security consideration is
necessary for bootstrapping trust because the need for security changes with contexts. Furthermore, in a
pervasive environment, some service-sharing contexts may need high security, and it is not sufficient to assign
initial trust using only past experience or context nature. In such situations, context security should make a
major contribution to the calculation of the initial trust value. In some real life applications of handheld devices,
a device (SP) needs to consider the security requirement of the service to be shared with another device (SR).
Such context security concerns need to be incorporated in the overall trust assignment including the initial trust
calculation. How a device will be trusted initially requires consideration of the security need of contexts, since it
can enhance the effectiveness of an entire trust model. Therefore, we also need a method in the trust model for
computing initial trust based on the security level of different contexts in order to incorporate a security factor
in the initial trust calculation.
Consider these scenarios that show the importance of a trust model as well as initial trust awareness of such
models.

Scenario 1.

Mr. Simon works as the front desk assistant in Aurora Hospital. He requests the duty roster file for the following
week from Dr. Mason, Co-ordination Manager of the hospital, and receives the file. Later he tries to get
a file containing sophisticated patient information, the same person but is denied. On the other hand
when Dr. Morrice, Director of Ophthalmology, requests those two files, he receives both.

Scenario 2.

Bob is a registered attendee at a conference. Unfortunately, Bob fails to reach the conference in time and
misses the key note speech. So he requests the voice files and receives them. Later he visits some
presenters’ (Dr. Iqbal, Dr. Haifeng and Dr. Sam) web pages and requests detailed information about
some of their ongoing works. However, they deny Bob’s request. Being persistent, Bob sends continual
requests for those files. As a consequence Bob was discarded from the network.

Scenario 3.

Sunny was walking through Mayfair shopping mall. Suddenly he saw the song ‘Hips don’t lie’ in the big screen.
He was interested to get that song in his mp3 player. So he requested that song through the wireless
network connection of the mall. Lubna had received that request but unfortunately she did not know
Sunny. So she requested a recommendation regarding Sunny. Most of the recommendations were
positive, but two unknown persons intentionally gave a negative recommendation about Sunny. Finally
Lubna decided not to share the song.

Scenario 4.

Rachel is an executive at a multinational company located in Washington and she has to travel by subway every
day. She is stranded in the subway because of some technical problems with the train on the day of an
important meeting, in which she is a keynote speaker. Some major problems will occur if she fails to
reach the office in time. She thinks of an alternative idea and calls one of her colleagues to do the
presentation in the meeting. Since there is little time left before the meeting, her colleague asks her to
send the presentation slides through e-mail. Rachel wants to instantly access the Internet, but does not
have Internet service on her cell phone or PDA; she wants to request Internet service from any nearby
devices.

Scenario 5.

Susan is a student intern in a hospital’s pediatric department. She has answered the call of a seriously ill child,
and wants the detailed medical information about that patient. The information is stored in the PDA of
her senior doctor, who is currently busy in emergency surgery. Susan wants to access that information
from her senior doctor’s PDA by requesting the specific healthcare assistant.
The first scenario implies that the trust value of Mr. Simon is not enough to get the sophisticated patient
information file. This scenario implies there should be various security levels or required trust values for
different services. In Scenario 2 Bob has been discarded due to his malicious behavior even though he was a
valid user. Scenario 3 implies that the recommended trust regarding Sunny was not sufficient enough to let him
download the music files. Scenario 4 indicates that internet service requires high security, and security factors
should be incorporated at the time of the initial trust calculation. Scenario 5 also points out that the requested
service requires security. Such security concerns should be considered in initial trust assessment because those
services require access to critical and confidential information. The above scenarios point out that a complete
trust model should be able to do the following tasks: (1) compute trust based on the interaction between
devices, (2) detect malicious nodes and (3) assign initial trust based on the security requirement of the context.

3. Related work
Trust models have been proposed by researchers considering the diverse scenarios of distributed systems, P2P
networks, agent based systems, pervasive computing, etc. Several well-known trust models (Zhou and Haas,
1999, Josang, 1996, Josang and Knapskog, 1998, Josang, 1999, Kagal et al., 2001a, Kagal et al., 2001b, Garfinkel,
1995) fail to be suitable in pervasive computing due to the unique characteristics of the environment. Due to the

presence of a fixed infrastructure (a fixed device has to act as security agent in each domain (Garfinkel, 1995)) or
central server (requirement of central key server (Kagal et al., 2001b)), several trust models are inappropriate
here since devices can leave or join at any moment. Trust models requiring pre-configuration like the Distributed
Public Key Model (Zhou and Haas, 1999) are also infeasible in a purely ad hoc scenario where participating
devices are not known ahead of time. Some trust models are not viable in this environment due to their overly
complex structure. This category includes Dynamic Trust Management (Blaze et al., 1996) (trust actions and
policies have been specified through complex language), Virtual Community Trust (Rahman and Hailes, 2000)
(extremely long recommendation chain), and Resurrecting Duckling model (Stajano and Anderson, 2002)
(hierarchical chain of security).
Some models (Guha and Kumar, 2004, Kamvar and Schlosser, 2003, Matthew and Agrawal,
2003, Theodorakopoulos and Baras, 2004) have little focus on direct and overall trust formation and mainly deal
with the composition and communication mechanism of trust data. A probabilistic approach has been adopted
in the Beta Reputation System (Ismail, 2002), B-trust (Quercia et al., 2006), and Learning Model (Huebscher and
McCann, 2005). Along with these models, a large number of recent trust models fall into the distributed and
dynamic category (Sharmin et al., 2006a, Almenarez et al., 2004, Shand et al., 2003, Jameel et al., 2005, Basu
and Callaghan, 2005, Wolfe et al., 2006, He et al., 2004). But these models suffer from one or more of the
following shortcomings: (1) failure to handle situations when a node is depending on old, valid
recommendations. (2) No methodology for a multi-hop recommendation. (3) Absence of a weighted
recommendation – we need this because all recommendations should not be treated equally. (4) Failure to
incorporate the security level of the context/service in trust or risk calculations. Moreover, most of the trust
models are node/device specific; that means they either trust or distrust a device as a whole. In real life
scenarios where a device may be trusted for a context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and not trusted for some other context 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 , the need
for a context specific trust model is evident.
One of the pioneer models is PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) (Garfinkel, 1995) where each node can act
as certification authority. But this model fails due to the requirement of a central key server. Rahman and Hailes
(1998) introduced the notion of ‘distributed trust model’. A Distributed Public Key Model (Zhou and Haas, 1999)
uses threshold cryptography and requires the pre-configuration of nodes. These models are expensive due to
battery power requirements. The reputed game theory and distributed algorithm are pillars of the trust model
proposed by Sun and Song (2004). Here we summarize some of the most recent approaches towards modeling
trust.
A generic Bayesian trust framework has been proposed in (Quercia et al., 2006). Here, each peer (𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 ) stores
four data sets for each context for all the nodes with which it has interacted. The data set are: Direct Trust Set
(DTS), Direct Experience Set (DES), Recommended Trust Set (RTS), and Sent Recommendation Set (SRS). Overall
trust is generated from a weighted calculation of both direct trust and recommended trust as a distributed trust
vector. A single trust value is extracted from the overall trust and sent to the decision module along with the
confidence value. From the output of the decision module, the peer 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 takes the best decision to perform.
When a peer (𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 ) interacts with a new peer, the new peer is assigned a constant value for direct
experience (Δ𝑑𝑑 ) and recommendation (Δ𝑟𝑟 ). But not mentioned anywhere is what the optimal values for these
constants should be. Based on peer-to-peer interaction, a tuple (𝑑𝑑1 ,𝑑𝑑2 , … ,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 ) is generated in this model
indicating the trust distribution. But no criteria or behavior model has been defined for generating elements in
the trust vector. It has been mentioned that, with the passage of time, the values for the elements in the tuple
will be converged to bootstrapping values, yet the time information has not been specified. This information
plays a vital role since the tuple entry is deleted when all the values converge to bootstrapping values. If the
defined time is too long, then a peer has to save a lot of entries. At the same time, if the amount of time is too

small, it might have to go through repeated trust calculations. This model is also device specific, not context
specific.
Sharmin et al. (2006a) proposed a trust model that works as a supporting module for SSRD (Simple and Secure
Resource Discovery) and MARKS (Sharmin et al., 2006b). Complete trust and complete distrust are represented
by 1.0 and 0.0, respectively. This context specific model supports reflexivity and partial transitivity. Each node
maintains a table of trust values for its neighbors. Unicast, multicast, or broadcast strategies are followed based
on the level of security of the offered service. Though this model indicates it is about the dynamic update of
trust values, that issue has not been further addressed; overall trust calculation has not been a focus of this
model. It does not consider a priority level of service when updating trust values.
Markus C. Huebscher and Julie A. McCann proposed a learning model for determining the trustworthiness of CP
(context providers) (Huebscher and McCann, 2005). Positive/negative feedbacks of other nodes (those that have
already considered service from the CP) and other CPs are input into a Bayesian parameter model that uses a
parameterized probability density function (here beta distribution has been used). In order to make the system
dynamic, a window of the last n feedbacks are counted in the beta distribution. The output of the Bayesian
model is a probability density function showing the trustworthiness of the context provider. A probabilistic
majority approach is used to nullify the effect of intentional negative feedback. A big limitation here is that is the
model assumes that every device is reachable by every other device. For that reason, it does not provide any
multi-hop recommendation mechanism.
Pervasive Trust Management (PTM) Model (Almenarez et al., 2004) is a decentralized trust model for ad hoc
environments. This dynamic model implements a recommendation-based trust protocol for transferring data.
Here a trust value of 0 represents complete distrust whereas 1 represents complete trust. First a belief space is
formed from prior information and later, based on interaction, an evidence space is developed. This model was
further enhanced to be a probabilistic trust model (Almenarez et al., 2006) that can be used as a beginning step
in risk assessment. Here, the trust value is the same for all contexts (services) of a specific device. Another
problem is that although a passive recommendation protocol has been incorporated, it is not capable of
properly handling multi-hop passive recommendations.
Shand et al. (2003) proposed a trust scheme along with a risk assessment model for sharing resources with an
effort to minimize user intervention. The trust assessment has been unified with access control. Trust on a node
has been represented by the pair (belief, disbelief) where (belief + disbelief) ⩽ 1. Nodes are divided into several
categories such as super user (owner), privileged, group, and public, which actually correspond to roles in RBAC
(Role Based Access Control) system. An overall recommendation is calculated through a transitive combination
of recommendation values. Not mentioned is how to avoid long chains of recommendations, and not addressed
is how to handle a new node with no prior interaction records.
Jameel et al. (2005) proposed a trust model based on the vectors of trust values formed by different nodes in
the network. The trust assessment depends on suggestions from neighboring entities that are mutually known
to both entities taking part in the interaction. A method for handling a false recommendation has also been
added. Xiu and Liu (2005) presented a generalized trust model with the intention to include all trust evaluation
and establishment strategies in a single model. They describe a high level idea with no details of how the whole
model will be implemented. Also absent are the verification or calculation methodologies for trust evidence and
overall trust.
Taking uncertainty into account, He et al. (2004) proposed a model of trust that is based on cloud theory (Li et
al., 1995). In order to elaborate the trust relationship involving two entities, a trust cloud has been introduced,
denoted by three digital attributes (Expected Value, Entropy, and Hyper-Entropy). They also effectively

differentiated between distrust and unknown trust. A trust instance value is calculated from the trust cloud to
make the ultimate decision regarding trust. A big limitation of this model is that all the entities are assumed to
be honest. Though a relatively new term ‘uncertainty’ has been introduced, major factors that have not been
considered include behavioral model and recommendation.
Lin et al. proposed a trust management model ‘MobileTrust’ (Lin and Varadharajan, 2005) to enhance security
with the help of trust. The model is intended for mobile agents in distributed computing systems. They provide
an approach for trust evaluation and updating the trust relationships of mobile agents. Risk was incorporated
later in their trust model (Lin and Varadharajan, 2006). A threshold parameter is used which is directly related to
risk on one side and system utility on the other. The performance of the model is highly dependant on this
parameter but the choice of value for this parameter has been left as future work. Peer Trust (Xiong and Liu,
2004) and Power Trust (Zhou and Hwang, 2007a) are special trust models designed for peer-to-peer overlay
networks with a Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) technique in order to achieve scalability in aggregating and
managing reputation data. A scalable, robust and fault-tolerant reputation aggregation technique called Gossip
Trust (Zhou and Hwang, 2007b) is designed for diverse and unstructured P2P networks (Gnutella, Kaaza, etc.). It
adopts the gossip protocol to aggregate global reputation scores. But it does not incorporate distance-based
aging of the nodes. The robust Bayesian reputation system (Buchegger and Boudec, 2004) provides a welldesigned model of punishment and redemption of misbehaving nodes in the network. But distance and timebased aging is also not considered for the mobile ad-hoc network.
Discussed so far are some trust models that do not explicitly address initial trust. However, researchers have
effectively devised some ways to estimate initial trust. Though our model calculates initial trust along the way of
evolution of trust, we discuss some important initial trust models next. One way of assigning initial trust value is
proposed in TRULLO (Quercia et al., 2007). This model uses “Single Value Decomposition” for trust
bootstrapping. It sets initial trust values that are not arbitrary but are based on properties of its user’s past
experience. The initial trust model called CCTB (Ahamed et al., 2008a) takes advantage of the correlation
existing between different contexts. It is also illustrated that CCTB offers a better initial trust value than some
other known models. This trust model did not address the security level of the context in initial trust
assessment. In another model (Ahamed et al., 2008b), the authors proposed an initial trust model. They
categorized contexts in different security levels in order to incorporate them in trust bootstrapping. This allows
the initial trust value to change proportionately with the context security level. A comparison of different
famous trust models is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Comparison of trust models.
Model
Adaptive Need
Light
Dynamic Distributed Context
Behavioral
Risk
DBA TBA
infrastructure weight
specific
model
model
support
B-trust Quercia06]
N/A
N
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
N
N
Y
SSRD [Sharmin06a]
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
PTM [Almenarez04]
N/A
N
Y
Y
Y
N
L
N
N
Y
FDTM [Xiu05]
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
LMT [Huebscher05]
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
L
N
N
Y
TUTC [Shand03]
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
TMUS [Jameel05]
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
L
N
N
Y
TRAC [Basu05]
N
N/A
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N/A
TPAN [Pirzada04]
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N/A
TFPC [Wolfe06]
N/A
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
CBTM [He04]
N/A
N
L
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Mobile Trust [Lin05]
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
L
N
N
Y
Our approach
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y – yes, N – no, L – limited, N/A – not available, MHR – multi-hop recommendation, DBA – distance-based aging, TBA – time-based aging.

Initial
trust
model
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y

4. Trust definition and trust properties
In order to maintain and build trust relationships, first it is necessary to have knowledge of trust. In this section,
we define the concept of trust and highlight some of its important characteristics.

4.1. Definition of trust

We define trust with a very popular commonly accepted definition (Gambetta, 1988): “[Trust] (or,
symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent will perform a
particular action, both before [we] can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity of ever be able to
monitor it) and in a context in which it affects [our] own action”. According to Gambetta, “trust is the probability
that the trusted entity A does something, which is beneficial to the trusting entity B”. Trust plays an important
role in the decision making about whether to reveal any information to the requesting service/device. Trust is
determined by the confidence level; depending on that confidence level, a user decides whether to give out
information or not and protect his/her privacy. Trust has been defined by several researchers (Almenarez et al.,
2004, Gambetta, 1988) from different points of view. Terms such as risk, confidence, probability, etc. have been
used in the definition of trust. Gambetta (1988) defined trust as the probability of doing something benevolent
by a trusted node A for the trustor Almenarez et al. (2004) described trust as “the belief that an entity has about
other entity, from past experiences, knowledge about the entity’s nature and/or recommendations from trusted
entities. This belief expresses an expectation on the entity’s behavior, which implies a risk”. In pervasive
computing, we formulate trust through previous and present interaction experiences of the associated nodes.

4.2. Characteristics of trust

In a pervasive environment, trust models and their properties can be referred through many formal
mathematical model properties. Some of these properties evolved to address the unique characteristics of this
environment. Thus, we define the properties of trust here from their scope in pervasive trust models. In forming
trust relationships and properties, we used the human trust scheme as an ideal model to follow. In this paper,
we used the term ‘context’ interchangeably with ‘service’. The term ‘node’ has been used to denote
participating devices (PDAs, cell phones, etc.) in the network. Throughout our paper, the term ‘interaction’
denotes an action (for example, a request or sharing) regarding a context or service. Complete trust and
complete distrust have been represented by the trust values 1 and 0, respectively. The binary
operator T indicates the trust relationship. Each node has a list of available contexts or
services (𝐶𝐶1 ,𝐶𝐶2 ,𝐶𝐶3 , … ,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ). In our model we consider the notation mentioned in Table 2.
Here, 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝜙𝜙 indicates that there is no direct trust value of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖

𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) =

𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) =

𝑘𝑘

�𝑖𝑖=1 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )
𝑚𝑚

𝑘𝑘
�𝑖𝑖=1 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )

𝑛𝑛

Section 7 provides details of the equation for the overall trust value calculation. Trust has the following
properties and relationships:
Table 2. Notations.
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) Direct trust of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
Average direct trust of A on B
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) Recommended trust of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
Average recommended trust of A on B

𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )
𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )
𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛

Initial trust of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
Overall trust value of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
Average overall trust of A on B
Number of available contexts for A
Number of contexts for which A has direct trust value for B
Number of contexts for which A has recommended trust value for B

C1. Reflexive: If a device A has several contexts (𝐶𝐶1 ,𝐶𝐶2 ,𝐶𝐶3 , … ,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ) then the trust value of A on itself for any
context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is 1

∀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 1)), where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑘𝑘

C2. Non-symmetric: For any context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the trust of node A on node B does not necessarily indicate the same
trust of B on A

𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶), ⇏ 𝑇𝑇(𝐵𝐵,𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )

Even if both A and B trust each other, that does not necessarily indicate the trust value of A on B (𝑇𝑇1 ) equals the
trust value of B on A (𝑇𝑇2 ). If we delve a bit more and expand on this property about a specific
context 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 where 𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ) indicates the trust of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 , then all the above statements also
hold. If both A and B have the same context 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 (for example we can think of a service date and time sharing) to
offer, then 𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ) indicates a high probability for 𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ).

C3. Partial transitive: If A trusts B and B trusts C for a particular context, then this chain relationship creates a
partial trust value for A on C

∀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )) = 𝛼𝛼 ∧ 𝑇𝑇(𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽 ⇒ 𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽)),where𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑘𝑘
C4. Non-antisymmetric: If A trusts B and B trusts A, that does not indicate A = B

(𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)) = 𝛼𝛼 ∧ 𝑇𝑇(𝐵𝐵,𝐴𝐴) = 𝛽𝛽 ⇏ 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐵𝐵),where 𝛼𝛼 o r𝛽𝛽 or may not be equal

C5. Dynamic: The trust value of a node A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 changes over time due to newer interactions

𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝜇𝜇 > 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝜇𝜇 < 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝜇𝜇 = 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

Here, μ indicates the satisfaction level for the latest interaction which is described later.
C6. Context aware: Node A may have different trust values on B for different contexts or services. If node A has
a trust value on B for a specific context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , this does not indicate that A will trust B for other available contexts

𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) ⇏ 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ),where𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗

C7. Time-based aging: The trust value of A on B for a specific context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 decreases with the passage of time

∀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ))𝑡𝑡 > 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑡𝑡+Δ𝑡𝑡 ), where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑘𝑘

C8. Distance-based aging: If node A collects trust values about B from other nodes in the network
(recommendation), the trust values collected from closer nodes should be counted with more weight compared
to the values collected from distant nodes. Distance-based aging ensures this feature.

5. Classification of trust
Trust in a pervasive environment mainly develops based on the interaction among devices. A device may
establish a trusted relation with another device based on the satisfaction of a direct interaction with that device.
This is known as Direct Trust. It is also possible to establish trust of other devices based on indirect interactions,
which is known as Recommended Trust. Recommended trust can be further categorized
into active and passive. Fig. 1 shows the classification of trust. We will discuss each type of trust and their
evolution in Section 7.

Fig. 1. Classification of trust.

6. Architecture of our trust model
A trust model in a pervasive environment is responsible for assigning a direct or recommended trust value for
each device and each context. The architecture of our trust model is shown in Fig. 2. This composite
model contains three main components: (1) trust model (FTM – Formalized Trust Model), (2) Initial Trust Model
(ITM), and (3) Malicious Recommendation Handler (MRH).

Fig. 2. Architecture of our model.

6.1. Architectural diagram

Our trust model has a component-based architecture which is shown in Fig. 2. In this section we briefly discuss
the architecture our model.

6.1.1. FTM
The Formal Trust Model (FTM) is comprised of Direct Trust Unit and Recommended Trust Unit. Direct trust is
formed through direct interaction experience among the nodes. A behavior model is used to evaluate the
satisfaction level of the direct interactions. A recommended trust protocol is used to evaluate the
recommendations to form recommended trust.

6.1.2. ITM
The Initial Trust Model (ITM) is responsible for assigning an adaptive initial trust for unknown devices. ITM
categorizes services in different security levels based on their security needs. A security factor is generated
based on the user’s disposition value and the security level of the requested service. Based on these values, an
initial trust value is generated. ITM is a separate component and it enhances the functionality of FTM (Haque
and Ahamed, 2007) by generating an adaptive initial trust value for unknown devices. However, as ITM mainly
works with direct trust, it has been shown as a part of direct trust component in Fig. 2.

6.1.3. MRH
This Malicious Recommendation Handler (MRH) is used for weeding out a malicious recommendation and thus
improving the accuracy of the trust model. It has two units. The 𝛼𝛼 Unit operates when the number of
recommendations is small. The operational methodology is based on control chart method. The 𝛽𝛽 Unit works
when the number of recommendations is large and this unit works on a probabilistic approach known as
Student’s 𝑡𝑡-Distribution.

6.2. State diagram

Trust model (FTM), Initial Trust Model (ITM), and Malicious Recommendation Handler (MRH) work together to
ensure trust establishment with minimal interaction with the user. As our trust model is service oriented, it
requires user interaction at the beginning to set security levels for several offered services. It also requires the
user to set the value of disposition based on the environment in which she/he belongs. Other than these, the
whole model operates transparently to the user. Fig. 3 represents the conceptual diagram of the model.

Fig. 3. State diagram of our model.

7. Trust formation

When a node joins a pervasive network for the first time, it does not have any prior interaction record or history.
A user’s circumvention is necessary to decide whether to trust or distrust that node. We use a behavioral model
to find a node’s pattern of behavior and its satisfaction level with some other nodes after each interaction. This
satisfaction level is used in updating direct trust values. Overall trust is formed through a weighted average of
direct trust and recommended trust. A decision module is responsible for making a decision based on the trust
value.

7.1. Direct trust formation

The evolution of direct trust depends on the direct interaction or experience with other devices. Based on the
satisfaction level of an interaction between two devices, they modify their direct trust value. This direct
interaction is shown by a direct link between A and B in the network topology in Fig. 4. This portion of trust is
critically important since it does not depend on the recommendation of any trusted neighbor. So when two
nodes, A and B, interact directly, they change their direct trust value based on the satisfaction level of that
interaction.

Fig. 4. A node topology with trust relationships.

7.2. Recommended trust formation

This is the trust value that is suggested by other trusted nodes about a specific node. For example, A knows B
and C but A does not know D. However, B and C know D. So B and C can send to A the trust values that they
have on D, which will be counted as recommended trust values for D.
We devise a general equation for the calculation of recommended trust. Consider a scenario where
node 𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 requests a context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 from 𝑤𝑤1 . The node 𝑤𝑤1 (SP) needs to know the recommended trust value
on 𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 (SR) to make the context sharing decision. Let us assume that there are 𝑛𝑛 paths (𝑝𝑝1 , … ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 ) with a
hop length greater than 1 from 𝑤𝑤1 to 𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 . We do not consider paths of length 1 in calculating recommended
trust since those paths indicate the direct interaction records. We use those paths in calculating direct trust only
(1) 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖

𝑇𝑇(𝑤𝑤1 ,𝑤𝑤2 )+𝑇𝑇(𝑤𝑤2 ,𝑤𝑤3 )+⋯+𝑇𝑇(𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧−1 ,𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 )
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where 𝑤𝑤1 ,𝑤𝑤2 , … ,𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 are the nodes on the path 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 from SP (𝑤𝑤1 ) to SR (𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 ) and

(2) 𝑇𝑇(𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 ,𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 )

𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 ,𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 ,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),where𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 ,𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 ,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) ≠ ∅
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𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 ,𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 ),otherwise

here, λ = hop distance between 𝑤𝑤1 (SP) and 𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 (SR),
𝜓𝜓 = Distance-based aging factor

The recommended trust value of 𝑤𝑤1 on 𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 in 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is calculated as
(3) 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝑤𝑤1 ,𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧 ,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )
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been used as a weight factor to satisfy the distance-based aging property

mentioned in Section 4.2.

Let us explain the situation with the help of Fig. 4. Assume that A wants a recommendation value for B. The
recommendation values for B follow the paths {A, E, F, B}, {A, E, F, D, C, B},{A, G, H, F, B}, and {A, G, H, F, D, C, B}
but not the path {A, B} which actually shows the interaction link of direct trust. The path length of a

recommendation is at least 2, and this path gets the highest weight since it is the shortest recommendation
path. In our model we used which means for a path of hop length 2, 95% of the recommendation value is
counted. The weight for the recommendation is decreased 5% with a single increment in the path length.
Criteria for choosing the value of 𝜓𝜓: Here we look for appropriate values for 𝜓𝜓 based on situations. In situations
where the environment is very sophisticated or the probability of the presence of malevolent nodes is quite
high, a node may not value a recommender who is quite a bit away and only trusts its close neighbors. In these
cases, a higher value of 𝜓𝜓 should be chosen. The higher the value of 𝜓𝜓, the higher the decrement rate for the
weight factor used in the recommended trust calculation. For example, if we choose 𝜓𝜓 = 1 instead of 0.5 in our

above example, then for a path of 2 hops, 90% �1 −

(2−1)×1.0
�
10

= 0.90 of the recommendation value is counted.

The decrement rate of the weight factor is 10% with a single increment in the path length which was 5%
with 𝜓𝜓 = 0.5.

Let us assume a scenario where SP needs the recommendation of SR. Assume that there are 5 paths
from SP to SR with hop lengths 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, and all the links (connecting line between 2 nodes)
on all the paths have a trust value of 0.9. The results of different recommendation values for different paths
(using Eq. (1)) and the recommendation trust (using Eq. (3)) have been summarized in Table 3 and Fig. 5.
Table 3. Recommended trust values with varying hops and ψ values.
𝜓𝜓
2 hop 3 hop 4 hop 5 hop 6 hop Rec. trust, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.5 0.855 0.81
0.765 0.72
0.675 0.765
1
0.81
0.72
0.63
0.54
0.45
0.63
1.5 0.765 0.63
0.495 0.36
0.225 0.495

Fig. 5. Comparison of recommendation values for different path length with different 𝜓𝜓 values.

Though we used quite a high trust value (0.9) in the links of all the paths, the average trust value quickly
decreases as the value for 𝜓𝜓 increases. Depending on the situation, a value between 0.5 and 1 works fine. The
average trust value decreases in a reasonable manner – neither too quickly nor too slowly.

7.2.1. Active recommendation

Sometimes a situation may occur where a node only believes the nodes with which it has direct interaction and
wants recommendations only from them. From this perspective, the idea of an active recommendation is
introduced, which is the average active recommendation value for a specific node considering only the minimum
length recommendation paths (2 hops). In Fig. 4, if A wants the active recommendation for F, then only the

paths {A, B, F} and {A, E, F} will be counted. Similarly, in Table 3, the recommended values for hop 2 are active
recommendation.

7.2.2. Passive recommendation
This is the recommendation that we usually think of. It considers all the paths (hop length ⩾ 2) from source to
destination. In general, we consider all the active recommendations to also be passive. However the reverse is
not true for all passive recommendations. Consider a passive recommendation of F for A, according to Fig. 4. All
the paths {A, B, F}, {A, E, F}, {A, B, C, D, F}, and {A, G, H, F} are considered.

7.3. Initial trust formation

Initial trust comes into play when the requester is either unknown to the provider for any context or only
unknown for the requested context. By the term “unknown”, we denote that the provider has no direct
experience, i.e., direct trust with the requester for the specific context. Suppose SR requests a service from SP in
the context Ci. ITM (see Section 6.1.2) can compute the initial trust value in three steps as follows, if the
provider has past experience with the requester:

Step 1.
A trust value t is estimated from the past experience of SP with the SR in other contexts, to be precise,
from 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),∀𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖

Step 2.

Security factor 𝜉𝜉, for the context to be bootstrapped, is computed. We describe this term later.

Step 3.

Finally, ITM bootstraps trust for SR in the requested context as 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑡𝑡 × 𝜉𝜉.

Otherwise, in the case of a completely unknown requester, ITM sets the provider’s disposition value 𝜃𝜃 as the
initial trust. The detail of the initial trust is described in Section 10.
In summary, the initial trust value for SP on SR for the context Ci is calculated as

𝑡𝑡 × 𝜉𝜉, where �
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) ≠ 0,∀𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = �
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝜃𝜃,
otherwise

8. Recommended trust protocol

In this section, we focus on the establishment method of recommended trust in our model. A provider
broadcasts a request message to get a recommendation for a specific requester (SR). Every device that receives
the message forwards this message unless it reaches any device that has direct interaction with the SR or the
maximum hop value diminishes to 1, whichever occurs first.

8.1. Message format

In our model, the devices use a common form of message to communicate with each other. The message format
is shown in Fig. 6. Type indicates whether it is a request or reply. Type = 0 for a request and Type = 1 for a reply
message. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the request id. The TS field contains a timestamp to thwart a replay attack. The next four
fields are the IDs of service provider, service requester, sender and receiver of the message, respectively. The
hop value, Hval, is followed by the total trust value over the path, Rval.

Fig. 6. Message format.

8.2. Active and passive recommendation protocol

For active and passive recommendation, we use two algorithms. Algorithms 1 and 2 give the pseudo code for
the request originator (denoted by SP), the request receiver (denoted by P), and the service requester (denoted
by SR), respectively.

8.2.1. Algorithm 1: RequestRecommendation
Algorithm 1 (see Fig. 8) has two phases – requesting phase and calculation phase. When SP wants to get a
recommendation for a specific requester SR, it starts from phase 1 and forms the request. The max_hop_value is
the maximum length of the path that SP wants to consider in the calculation of the recommended trust value
for SR. The value may be device specific or a system parameter. For our model, we consider. When SP wants to
consider only an active recommendation, it sets max_hop_value to 2. The optimal value for max_hop_value is
discussed later in this section. The hops beyond this value need not be considered while determining
recommended trust value. The service provider uses a broadcast address in the field of receiver host address so
that the packet reaches all its neighbors. The provider now enters phase 2 where it listens to the replied
messages until the timer goes off. Whenever SP receives a reply from its neighbor, it adds the trust value of the
link with the Rval of the reply message. Then it calculates the total weighted recommended trust. SP keeps on
listening and doing the accounting until the timer goes off. Finally, the provider computes the average
recommended trust value for the SR.
We know that when a new device joins a network, the trust value that the service provider has on it is θ (see
disposition value of the service provider, in Section 10). Suppose the service provider is neutral to the new
device, i.e., 𝜃𝜃 = 0.5. The portion of trust from 0 to 0.5 can be considered the path of negative trust level while
the rest (0.5–1) as the path of positive trust level. If we receive a recommended trust value along a path which is
less than or equal to 0.5, this is not going to help the requester node in building positive trust. We devise the
algorithm in such a way that it does not decrease the overall recommendation value when considering a long
path that has high trust values in all the links but poor recommendation values due to the weight factor. At the
same time, we do not want to discard a path that generates a poor recommendation value due to malevolent
behavior of the SR. Consider the following Fig. 7 to understand the scenario.

Fig. 7. A topology of devices with trust relationships.

Fig. 8. Algorithm 1 RequestRecommendation.
Device G (SR) sends a request for a service to A (SP) which requires a trust value of 0.7. Since A does not know G
(which means G has a trust value of 0.5), A requests a recommendation. Note there are three paths from A to G
which are {A, B, C, D, E, F, G}, {A, H, G}, and {A, I, J, G} with path lengths of 6, 3, and 2, respectively. Here, the
value of 𝜓𝜓 is considered 0.5 so that the weight factor is 0.95 for a path of 2 hops, 0.90 for a path of 3 hops and
so on (see Section 7.2). See (Table 4).

Table 4. Average recommended trust for G (SR) to A (SP) from Fig. 7.
Path
Unweighted recommended trust, 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
{A, B, C, D, E, F, G}
{A, H, G}
{A, I, J, G}

(0.7 + 0.7 + 0.7 + 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.6)/6 = 0.65
(0.6 + 0.3)/2 = 0.45
(0.8 + 0.7 + 0.7)/3 = 0.73

Hop
length, 𝜆𝜆
6
2
3

Weight factor,
(𝜆𝜆 − 1) × 𝜓𝜓
�1 −
�
10
0.65
0.95
0.90

Weighted
recommended
trust, 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
0.49
0.43
0.66

Avg. recommended
trust, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
0.55

For path {A, B, C, D, E, F, G}, the algorithm calculates the unweighted recommended trust value as 0.65 which is
greater than 0.5. Thus, the unweighted recommended value calculated for this path indicates positive trust level
for the node G. But when this trust value is multiplied by the weight factor, we get a value of 0.49 which is
beyond the positive trust level. This path will have a negative impact on the overall trust value of A on G which is
already 0.5. In that case, G will appear as a non-trusted node to A. So we discard this path from calculation of
recommendation trust because G cannot be made non-trusted for being a distant node. Meanwhile, for path {A,
H, G} the unweighted recommended trust value is 0.45 which indicates that the trust level is negative for G even
without considering a weight factor. Multiplying this value (0.45) by the weight factor (0.95) generates a
weighted recommended trust of 0.43 for this path. Though the trust value is less than 0.5 we consider this path
to take into account the malevolent behavior of G. Finally path {A, I, J, G} is also counted because it generates a
weighted recommendation value of 0.66 which is greater than 0.5. The average recommended trust value gets
the value of 0.55.
In summary, two things happen in the case of a node with an already positive trust level. First, the paths which
yield positive recommendations before and after applying the distance-based aging are considered. Second, the
paths with negative recommendation even before applying the distance-based aging are counted towards
determining the average recommendation. However, for an already malevolent node, every path is counted and
no such considerations are necessary.
Optimal hop length. In our model, a device has the flexibility to define the maximum length of a
recommendation path through the ‘Hop value’ (Hval) field of the request packet. Here, we provide some
guidelines for choosing the value of Hval.
1. For a very small Hval, the response time required for calculating the recommended trust will be short.
However it may not consider several possible recommendation paths with hop lengths greater than that
specified in the Hval. So there is a tradeoff between response time and accuracy of the recommended
trust for the specified Hval.
2. The upper bound of the Hval value is related to the weight factor and disposition value (see Section 10)

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ⩽

Disposition Value,𝜃𝜃
Decrement rate of weighting factor per hop

According to our model, the equation becomes

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ⩽

𝜃𝜃
(𝜆𝜆 − 1) × 𝜓𝜓
𝜆𝜆 × 𝜓𝜓
− �1 −
�1 −
�
10
10 �

In our scenario, we consider 𝜃𝜃 = 0.5 and 𝜓𝜓 = 0.5. So the decrement rate of the weight factor is 5%. Therefore
the maximum value for Hval becomes,
(4) 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻

⩽

0.5

0.05

= 10

Our algorithm is not going to consider any recommendation path with the higher trust values in its intermediate
links but generating a poor recommendation (less than or equal to 0.5) for this path when it is multiplied by a
small weight factor (as the recommendation path has a long length). Therefore, it is not meaningful to use such
a high Hval, because some recommendation paths with a length that is within the specified limit of Hval will
generate an overall recommendation of less than or equal to 0.5.

Consider a scenario where device A requires a recommendation for device B. Consider a path of length 10 from
A to B and assume that all the intermediate links have a trust value of 1.0. According to Eq. (1) the
recommendation value for B through this path will be

𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = �

(10 − 1) × 0.5
1 + ⋯+ 1
� × �1 −
� = 0.55
10
10

Now consider paths from A to B with length greater than 10. The recommendation value will be less than or
equal to 0.5 irrespective of the trust values of the intermediate links, and this path will be discarded by our
algorithm. This indicates that any Hval value greater than 10 will generate the same overall recommendation
trust value which will be generated when Hval = 10. But the increased Hval value will certainly increase the
response time. So, in this scenario, 10 is the upper limit thus proving Eq. (4).

8.2.2. Algorithm 2: ReplyRecommendation
Each receiver invokes the ReplyRecommendation function (see Fig. 9) whenever he receives any request. If it is a
duplicate request, the receiver simply discards it. Otherwise the receiver proceeds to the next step. As the
request already includes the hop between him and the request forwarder, he reduces the Hval by one. If the
receiver discovers that the service requester is his peer, he just forms the as shown in Algorithm 2 and sends the
reply message back to the request forwarder. In another case, he may simply forward the message to his
neighbors to collect recommendations from them. Upon receiving a reply from any peer, he adds the trust value
of that link with Rval of the packet and changes the sender and receiver addresses of the packet to send it back
to the node that has forwarded the request to him. Eventually the request originator receives all the
recommended trust values.

Fig. 9. Algorithm 2 ReplyRecommendation.

9. Direct trust protocol
In this section we describe the details of the behavioral model along with the process of direct trust evolution.

9.1. Categories of behavior

Devices in a pervasive environment may behave differently from one another. We, therefore, classified the
behavior of devices in four different categories which is shown in Fig. 10.

Fig. 10. Classification of behavior.

9.1.1. Positive behavior
Positive behavior refers to some type of rewarding attitude. This type of behavior helps in increasing the direct
trust value, so over the course of time, a positively behaving device may expect its direct trust value to be
increased.

9.1.2. Negative behavior
The opposite of positive behavior is negative behavior, which results in punishment. One common example of
negative trust can be delay in providing a service.

9.1.3. Neutral behavior
Some behaviors may indicate neither positive nor negative attitude and are characterized by neutral behavior
(for example, a node requests a service and is denied). No action is taken in case of neutral behavior.

9.1.4. Malevolent behavior
The malicious attitude of devices is termed malevolent behavior, such as attacks, and is punished severely.
Negative behavior is separated from malevolent behavior because, unlike negative behavior, malicious
behavior is a clear indication that the device is malicious.
For malevolent behavior, an alert message is broadcasted. The alert message results in an immediate deposition
of the malevolent node whereas negative behavior will just result in decrease of trust value. But all positive
behaviors should not be treated equally since these behavior rs may vary widely in terms of weight and impact.
This statement is equally true for negative behaviors. Thus, we classified both positive and negative behaviors
into three categories.
As device behavior may vary depending on the application, it is always difficult to develop a general behavioral
model. Our classification takes a step forward for a general purpose behavioral model.

9.2. Overview of behavioral model

Fig. 11 shows the positive and negative behaviors of devices with their distribution of trust among ‘Low’,
‘Medium’ and ‘High’ categories.

Fig. 11. Classification of trust based on behavior.
We devised equations to calculate the satisfaction level (𝜇𝜇) based on a weighted average technique. The
notations used in this equation are summarized in Table 5. The equation for satisfaction level calculation is:

𝜇𝜇 =

𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) + 𝐵𝐵(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑧𝑧 + 𝑜𝑜 + 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑞𝑞

where

𝑥𝑥

𝑦𝑦

𝑧𝑧

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑗𝑗=1

𝑘𝑘=1

𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) = ��(𝐵𝐵ℎ(+)𝑖𝑖 × 𝑘𝑘) + �(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(+)𝑗𝑗 × 𝑣𝑣) �(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(+)𝑖𝑖 × 𝜋𝜋)�

and

𝑝𝑝

𝑜𝑜

𝑞𝑞

𝑚𝑚=1

𝑙𝑙=1

𝑛𝑛=1

𝐵𝐵(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) = � � (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(−)𝑚𝑚 × 𝜍𝜍) + �(𝐵𝐵ℎ(−)𝑙𝑙 × 𝜛𝜛) + �(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(−)𝑛𝑛 × 𝜏𝜏)�/ 𝑛𝑛
Table 5. Notations used in the calculation of satisfaction level.
𝜇𝜇
Satisfaction level (the satisfaction level, actually indicates the direct trust value for this
latest interaction)
B(positive)
Sum of all positive behaviors
B(negative)
Sum of all negative behaviors
𝐵𝐵ℎ(+) ,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(+) ,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(+) High, medium, and low positive behaviors, respectively
𝐵𝐵ℎ(−) ,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(−) ,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(−) High, medium, and low negative behaviors, respectively
𝜂𝜂
Priority level of the context associated with this interaction
𝜅𝜅, 𝜈𝜈, 𝜋𝜋
Values associated with each high, medium, and low category of positive behavior
𝜛𝜛, 𝜍𝜍, 𝜏𝜏
Values associated with each high, medium, and low category of negative behavior
𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞
{𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝, and 𝑞𝑞} denote the number of high, medium, and low positive and
corresponding negative behaviors occurring for this interaction
We divided the sum of negative behaviors by 𝜂𝜂, assuming that the priority of contexts is a positive integer value.
This is because when a highly sophisticated context receives a negative behavior, that incident should receive
more punishment compared to a situation where the same negative behavior is applied to a trivial or less
prioritized context. In our model, we used 𝑘𝑘 = 1,𝑣𝑣 = 0.8,𝜋𝜋 = 0.6,𝜛𝜛 = 0.4,𝜍𝜍 = 0.2,𝜏𝜏 = 0, respectively. These
variables are used to permit modifications of these values based on the application requirements. All these
variables can be used to adjust the rate of change of a direct trust value.

9.3. Properties of behavioral model

Some of the important properties (P1, P2, P3, and P4) of our behavior model are as follows:

P1.
Our behavioral model ensures a small reward for positive behavior but increasing punishment for
negative behavior. Our motivation behind such logic is proposed by Baier (1986) who states, “Trust is
much easier to maintain than it is to get started and is never hard to destroy”.

P2.
The value of a positive behavior is not dependent on the priority level of context. As it is expected that
all behaviors will be positive, the positive behavior value does not change with the priority level of
associated contexts. For negative behavior, the level of punishment varies with the priority level of the
associated context.

P3.
In our behavioral model, a single interaction may consist of any combination (0 or more) of positive,
negative, neutral, and malevolent behaviors.

(𝑏𝑏+1 ,𝑏𝑏+2 , … ,𝑏𝑏+𝑤𝑤 ),(𝑏𝑏−1 ,𝑏𝑏−2 , … ,𝑏𝑏−𝑥𝑥 ),
𝐼𝐼(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = �
�
(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛1 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛2 , … ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ),(𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚1 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚2 , … ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )

Here, 𝑏𝑏+ ,𝑏𝑏− ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , and 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 represents positive, negative, neutral, and malevolent behaviors, respectively.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model that considers an interaction from this vector point
of view. To denote the usefulness of this strategy, consider a scenario where device A gets a
context 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 from B. Suppose A drew attention in two behaviors: successful completion of the context and
time required for the context sharing. The result from device A on these two criterions might be
different, for example, highly positive for successful completion and low positive on time required. Thus,
instead of denoting the overall satisfaction of A as positive, this strategy provides the opportunity to
more accurately categorize separately each criteria of a context and their behaviors.

P4.
Special attention has been given to handling an event which may appear to be wrong but difficult to
prove that it had been done deliberately, for example, repeatedly requesting the same service within a
short duration. We put such events in the low negative category (with a trust value of 0.4) to ensure that
these types of behaviors do not receive much punishment.

9.4. Evolution of direct trust

The value of direct trust changes when device A wants a context from 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 B and receives it. This evolution of
direct trust depends on the satisfaction level of the interaction between the interacting devices. If A has a
previous direct trust value with B for context and is the satisfaction level for the latest interaction, then the new
trust value will be the average of these two. This process supports the characteristic ‘time-based aging’
(Section 4.2.) since we are giving 50% weight on the latest interaction outcome and the rest on the direct trust
value incurred from previous interaction records. If there is no previous direct trust value then this becomes the
current direct trust value. Therefore, the equation for direct trust evolution is:
(5) 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝑉𝑉,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 +𝜇𝜇

=�
𝜇𝜇,

2

, where𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ≠ 𝜙𝜙
otherwise

9.5. Simulation results of direct trust

We generated direct trust by simulating it based on the values of positive and negative behaviors of different
categories. Next we present graphs that describe simulation results.
In Fig. 12a–d below, the X-axis shows direct trust. In Fig. 12a and b, the increment and decrement of trust values
for positive and negative behaviors of different categories are shown.

Fig. 12. (a–d) Simulation results of direct trust.
We tested our model for negative behavior when applied to different priority levels. As seen in Fig. 12c, when
the same medium negative behavior is applied to different priority levels, the higher the priority level (PL3) the
faster the rate of decrement of the direct trust value. Here PL(1) means context with priority level 1, the lowest
priority level.
According to our distribution of trust values in different categories, a low positive behavior converges to 0.6 and
a low negative behavior converges to 0.4 (for a context with priority level 1). From Fig. 12d, we find, this
convergence rate is the same for a context with priority level 1. Here, the low positive behavior curve converges
from 0 to 0.6 at around the 8th consecutive low positive behavior and, at the same time, the low negative
behavior curve converges from 1 to 0.4. But this convergence rate becomes much higher when low negative
behavior is applied to a context of priority level 2 and 3, as shown in Fig. 12d.
The direct trust value becomes 0.4 only at the second consecutive low negative behavior when the priority level
is 2. When two consecutive low negative behaviors are applied to a context of priority level 3, the direct trust
value goes from 1 to nearly 0.35. This proves the desirable property 1 mentioned in Section 5.3 which states
‘Small reward for positive behavior but increasing punishment for negative behavior’. Here, Bl(−)PL(1) means
low negative behavior applied to context with priority level 1.

10. Initial trust protocol
Our initial trust scheme takes into account the security level of the services while establishing trust. The two
major characteristics of the initial trust model are as follows:
Sensitive to context security: The initial trust value for a context should be inversely proportional to its security
level. In other words, the initial trust value of a context with a high security level should be lower than that of a
context with a low security level

𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) < 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ),if𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 > 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖

Able to adapt disposition of user: The disposition value indicates a user’s (service provider’s) personality in
sharing or providing services. Each device that runs ITM can adjust the behavior of SP by changing the
disposition value. The modified value reflects the user’s change in preference.
We categorize services based on their need for security. It means that each service is associated with an integer
value representing its security level. We use this numerical value to bootstrap the initial trust for the
corresponding service. It is obvious that not all services of a device need to have the same security level.

Similarly, the same service in different devices, whether within the same network or not, may have different
security levels. Each SP maintains a table of its services along with the security level. It does not have to provide
services for all security levels. In our model, we assume the range of security levels of contexts is 1 ∼ 10.

Security factor 𝜉𝜉 is computed for bootstrapping an unknown trust according to Eq. (6). It is introduced to
integrate the security issues of contexts in initial trust calculation. In other words, 𝜉𝜉 is the weight factor that
makes our model sensitive to context security levels. If a SR requests a service for Ci from SP, then 𝜉𝜉 is calculated
as follows:
(6) 𝜉𝜉

=1−

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 −1×𝜃𝜃
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = security level of context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝜃𝜃 = disposition value; we describe it later. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = maximum
security level and in this paper it is 10. For example, if 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 10 for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , then 𝜃𝜃 is 0.55, whereas for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =
0.5, 𝜃𝜃 is 0.8. The higher the security level of a context, the more the security factor is reduced by Eq. (6). As a
result, it adapts the bootstrapped trust value by Step 3 (see Section 7.3).

Disposition value 𝜃𝜃 represents a numerical value that interprets the disposition of a service provider to a new
requester. The range of interpreted values of 𝜃𝜃 is [0, 1]. We label three positions on the θ scale as the nature of
user: pessimist, optimist, and neutral (see Fig. 13).

Fig. 13. Disposition values of a service provider.
By assigning a value to 𝜃𝜃, a service provider can control his own attitude towards new devices that are about to
join the network or the devices that are new to a context. Depending on the SP’s mobility, a disposition value
can be fixed or variable. The value assignment to 𝜃𝜃, in fact depends on the environment or network to which the
user belongs. A user can adaptively behave by changing his disposition value. Fig. 14 shows how the security
factor 𝜉𝜉 changes with the security level of contexts for different values of 𝜃𝜃. With the increase in the security
level, 𝜉𝜉 remains constant for 𝜃𝜃 = 0. It represents an optimistic behavior of a service provider, as estimated
trust t becomes the bootstrapped trust. Given 𝜃𝜃 = 0.5,𝜉𝜉 drops by 0.05 with a single level increase in the security
of service. It reflects SP’s neutral behavior, as estimated t is moderately reduced with increasing service security
levels. SP shows its pessimistic attitude when θ=1 as 𝜉𝜉 drops by 0.1 with a single level increase. As a result, the
bootstrapped trust value is drastically reduced.

Fig. 14. Comparison of security factor for different security levels due to different disposition value of SP.
Suppose service provider A is in a trusted network such as a school or office. Here, A may want to share his
services with other devices without any type of security constraint. A can easily set 𝜃𝜃 = 0 to behave as an
optimist. After leaving his office, A travels in a subway train to return home. Obviously, a subway train is not a
fully trusted environment. Therefore he changes 𝜃𝜃 from 0 to 0.5 to reflect his neutral behavior. Over the
weekend, when he goes to a marketplace or multiplex, he can assign 𝜃𝜃 = 1, the pessimistic attitude, as
surrounding people as well as devices are unknown. Finally, we assume that an interface is provided in the
devices that can adaptively control the disposition of a user in case of sharing or providing services in a pervasive
environment.
To demonstrate how ITM bootstraps trust, we consider device A provides services to {B, C, D, E} in the
contexts {𝐶𝐶1 ,𝐶𝐶2 ,𝐶𝐶3 ,𝐶𝐶4 }. Suppose B sends a request to A for the context 𝐶𝐶2 . SP finds that B is new to this context
and therefore it needs to calculate the initial trust value for B in the context 𝐶𝐶2 . ITM bootstraps trust for devices
in contexts by following the steps we mentioned earlier (see Section 7.3).

Step 1.

Step 2.

Step 3.

At this step, trust 𝑡𝑡 is derived using the mechanism mentioned in Quercia et al. (2007). Here, the trust
matrix is decomposed into three other matrices using singular value decomposition (Abdi, 2007). It
determines the contexts in which B has already been served by A. Based on some predefined cases and
by performing a sequence of steps, 𝑡𝑡 is estimated. A detail analysis of trust estimation process can be
found in Quercia et al. (2007).
The security level of the context now needs to be incorporated with the estimated trust. We do this by
determining the security factor 𝜉𝜉 which integrates the security issues in initial trust assignment. This
security factor 𝜉𝜉 works as a weight factor that makes our initial trust model sensitive to context security
levels. ITM calculates 𝜉𝜉 from Eq. (6) by using the security level of 𝐶𝐶2 , i.e., 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 and 𝜃𝜃, the disposition of A.

Having estimated the trust value t and security factor 𝜉𝜉 for 𝐶𝐶2 , ITM computes the initial trust value of A
on B in the context 𝐶𝐶2 using the process mentioned in Subsection 7.3. This is the initial trust
value 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶2 ). In this way, an SP can derive an initial trust value of an SR for an unknown context.
Therefore, the incorporation of a context security level in trust bootstrapping allows our initial trust
model to be sensitive to the security requirements of different contexts.

11. Overall trust calculation

In our model, each device maintains a trust table. In the table for each context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 a device (requester) has two
fields, direct trust (𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 ) and recommended trust (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 ). Suppose for some context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , device A may have 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 but
no 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 for device B. This can occur when B has requested a trivial and very low priority context, and A has not
asked for a recommendation for a very low priority service and instead provided that service directly.
Conversely, B can request a context with high priority level. Since A had no prior interaction record with B, A
asked for a recommendation about B for that context. After getting the recommendation value, A denied to
provide B with that context since the trust value was too low. At this stage, A has 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 for B but no 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 . In
calculating overall trust, if the 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 field for 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is empty, then DT is assumed to be the 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) (see Eq. (5)). The
overall trust value of A on B for context 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is calculated as

𝜂𝜂 × 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )
⎧
,
𝜂𝜂 + 1
⎪
⎪
𝑇𝑇 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),
𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝐷𝐷
⎨𝜂𝜂 × 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) ,
⎪
𝜂𝜂 + 1
⎪
⎩𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),
Here, 𝜂𝜂 denotes the priority level of 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 .

where 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 ≠ ∅ and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 ≠ ∅
where 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 ≠ ∅ and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = ∅

where 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 = ∅ and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 ≠ ∅

where 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 = ∅ and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = ∅

When the value 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) is available in the calculation, we multiplied this value by 𝜂𝜂 because when a node
requests a higher priority context than is normal, the SP will give more weight to its direct experience and less
weight to the recommended value.

𝑇𝑇(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) =

𝑘𝑘

�𝑖𝑖=1(𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ))
𝑚𝑚 + 𝑛𝑛

Here 𝑘𝑘 denotes the total number of contexts, and 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑛𝑛 denote the number of contexts for which A
has 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 values, respectively, for B.

The overall trust information is provided to the decision module which makes a final decision based on the input
and some defined policies. These policy definitions will depend on the application which will use the trust
model.

12. Handling malicious recommendation
Circumventing a malicious recommendation can highly influence the performance of any trust model. However,
a majority of trust models have avoided this by passing this responsibility on to an authentication mechanism.
Since an authentication mechanism does not allow any malicious nodes to join the network, there is no concern
about malicious recommendations. But real life scenarios and facts prove otherwise. Malicious nodes may exist
even after adopting authentication techniques. We propose a simple protocol for restricting a malicious
recommendation and gradually weeding out all malicious nodes. The MRH component of our trust model
performs this protocol to deal with malicious recommendations. This protocol is based on a Student’s 𝑡𝑡Distribution (Gosset, 2008, Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972).

12.1. Issues regarding malevolent nodes

One important issue regarding a malicious recommendation is what happened when a node is detected as
malevolent in the network. An alert message will be broadcast upon detecting a node’s malevolent behavior.
The alert message will be handled in the same way as interactions between peer nodes with positive trust levels.
Even if a malicious node was previously assigned a positive trust value, once detected as malevolent, it is
immediately deposited from the list and permanently treated as non-trusted. A node may consider more than
one alert message from trusted entities to permanently mark a malevolent node as non-trusted. There is no way
to readapt the node. The rehabilitation of malicious nodes remains for future research and is not addressed in
our paper. Here we assume that the number of benevolent nodes is much higher than that of malicious nodes.
Flooding of malicious recommendations cannot occur since a node can send only one recommendation about
another node.
First, we consider the situation where the number of recommendations is few. We assume the standard
deviation is known. To evaluate our proposal we have fitted the control chart method. This was first used by

Walter Shewart to determine whether the process metrics are stable. In the evaluation of metric data, Zultner
proposed two types of control charts: (1) moving range control chart and (2) individual control chart (Zultner,
1999).
Let us take a data set of 10 recommendations which are as follows: {0.9, 0.88, 0.85, 0.75, 0.78, 0.8, 0.73, 0.2,
0.87, 0.9}. A moving range control chart has been generated by plotting the difference between successive
observations. In Fig. 15a, mR bar denotes the average of moving range values while UCL indicates the Upper
Control Limit. Here, UNPL and LNPL denote Upper Natural Process Limit and Lower Natural Process Limit,
respectively. In the individual control chart, 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 = mean of the observed recommendation values,
and 𝜎𝜎 = standard deviation.

Fig. 15. (a–c) Illustration of different types of chart.
Here we set the upper limit to 1 (maximum possible recommendation value) and the lower limit to 0 (maximum
possible recommendation value). From Fig. 15b, we find that all the recommendation values lie within the
region defined by +1𝜎𝜎 and −1𝜎𝜎 deviation lines about the mean with the exception of 0.2 which lies even below
the LNPL. We discard any recommendation value which is not within the interval (0.590637 (value of −1𝜎𝜎),
0.941363 (value of +1𝜎𝜎)). (See Table 6)

Table 6. Mean, standard deviation, and upper–lower limits for different confidence values.
Mean
0.766
Standard deviation
0.2082
Confidence level (%) LCL
UCL

90
95
99

0.645381 0.886619
0.61715 0.91485
0.55216 0.97984

For a large number of recommendations, we refer to Fig. 15c. Here we use the approach of Student’s tDistribution. This approach is used when the standard deviation is not known. For example, let us take a data set
of 10 recommendations which are as follows: {0.9, 0.88, 0.85, 0.75, 0.78, 0.8, 0.73, 0.2, 0.87, 0.9}. In this
distribution, a confidence value of 90% indicates that the mean of the data set will be in the interval specified by
UCL (Upper Confidence Limit) and LCL (Lower Confidence Limit). In Fig. 15c, we show the following results for
different confidence levels.

12.2. Approaches of malicious recommendation handling process

The information from the interval region is used in two ways, and we name these approach 1 and approach 2.
We discard any recommendation value which is outside this interval region; we take the mean of the rest of the
values as the overall recommendation value. The optimization is readily observable. The old overall
recommendation value of 0.766 is replaced by a much accurate overall recommendation value of
0.828889 ((0.9 + 0.88 + 0.85 + 0.75 + 0.78 + 0.8 + 0.73 + 0.87 + 0.9)/9).

If the recommendation value given by a specific device falls outside the interval region for more than a specified
threshold value (Δ), the device will be discarded.

Approach 1:

In the first approach, a device will be discarded if

𝑤𝑤1 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑤𝑤2 𝛽𝛽 + 𝑤𝑤3 𝜆𝜆 ⩾ Δ,

where 𝑤𝑤1 ,𝑤𝑤2 , and 𝑤𝑤3 are weight factors with 𝑤𝑤1 < 𝑤𝑤2 < 𝑤𝑤3

𝛼𝛼 = number of times a device sends recommendations which falls in the
interval (+1𝜎𝜎, +2𝜙𝜙] or (−1𝜎𝜎, −2𝜙𝜙]. This is computed by the unit shown in Fig. 2 in 6.1.

𝛽𝛽 = number of times a device sends recommendations which falls in the
interval (+2𝜎𝜎, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈] or (−2𝜎𝜎, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿]. This is computed by the unit shown in Fig. 2 in 6.l.

𝛿𝛿 = number of times a device sends recommendations which has value greater than or equal to UNPL or
lower than or equal to LNPL.

Approach 2:

In the second approach, a device will be discarded if

𝜂𝜂 ⩽ 𝛥𝛥,

where 𝜂𝜂 = number of times a device sends a recommendation which falls outside the interval defines by
UCL and LCL.
The value of is dependent on the level of importance of the environment. In a highly sophisticated
environment, a very small number of out of range recommendations will put a device out the of
network, whereas more tolerance can be shown in a less sophisticated environment.

13. Evaluation
We evaluated our proposed trust model in the following ways:
(1) Implementation of the prototype.
(2) Measurement of the performance with remaining battery power.
(3) Performance measurement using simulation.

13.1. Simulation results

We simulated our model using OMNeT++ to evaluate several issues such as scalability, timing requirement, etc.
One of our objectives was to find the required time when the recommendation path gets longer. We simulated a
scenario where node B (SR) requests a service from A (SP). We assumed that there are five paths from A to B
with path lengths of 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively. We measured the required time for getting recommendations
along these paths. We repeated this computation five times and calculated the average recommendation time
along different paths. The results are shown below (Fig. 16).

Fig. 16. Timing requirement for receiving recommendation packets for varying path lengths.

13.2. Implementation of the prototype

We implemented our trust model and a service-sharing application that uses the underlying trust model.
802.11b protocol has been used on Dell Axim X50v PDAs. We used VC++.NET Compact framework for the
implementation. Some screen shots of our implementation are shown in Fig. 17.

Fig. 17. (a–h) Some screen shots from our implementation.

13.3. Performance measurement using battery power

Our model consumes a small amount of battery power. In order to prove this statement, we measured the
remaining amount of battery power in two scenarios. (1) When our model is not running on a PDA. (2) When our
model is running on a PDA. As we see from the graph, the decrement rate of remaining battery power is almost
the same in both scenarios (Fig. 18). We did not begin from the same starting point but adjusted this because
the two curves almost merge together, making the comparison difficult to observe.

Fig. 18. Rate of decrement of remaining battery power before and after running our model.

14. Conclusion and future works
Secure communications cannot occur between entities in a pervasive environment unless a trust relationship
has been established. The vast majority of such relationships use identity as a basis for establishing trust. A
flexible trust model, built upon a formal basis, is essential in providing secure communications in the future
world of pervasive computing. In this paper, we present a context aware reputation-based trust model. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first model that provides a mechanism for handling multi-hop
recommendations. At the same time, it integrates a dynamic initial trust for unknown devices which is based on
the security level of contexts. As an attempt to simulate human trust, we augmented our model with both time
and distance-based aging of trust values. The security level of a context has been considered to make our model
more liable to prioritized contexts. The security level of context is also considered while computing initial trust.
A model for separating malicious recommendations and gradually weeding out malicious nodes has been
incorporated in our model. We have also introduced the disposition, used with initial trust establishment, in this
paper. Furthermore, we introduce in this paper an upper limit on selection of hops, malicious recommendation
handling, and simulated results for the behavioral model. For evaluation purpose, a simple resource sharing
application operating on our trust model has been implemented. We tested the scalability issue of our model
using OMNeT++ simulator. The discussion on vulnerability of the model in the face of different types of attacks
has been kept out of the scope of this paper. We have discussed this issue in detail, with a solution, in our
previous paper (Haque and Ahamed, 2007).
In the future, we plan to incorporate a risk assessment model with this trust model. The path discovery issues
and the analysis of communications overhead in a hop-based recommendation protocol are considered our
future research work. We are also in the process of incorporating this trust model in a healthcare and elderly
care application on a handheld device. We will be able to perform a very realistic usability study with persons
who are real patients and users of the application.
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